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Abstract: Refugee status determination (RSD) is often rendered
unusually difficult due to a lack of available documentary evidence to either support or contradict asylum seekers' claims as
to their experiences in their countries of origin (including their
reasons for seeking asylum abroad). This field's reliance upon
asylum seekers' own testimonies with regard to their experiences means that 'credibility assessment' is uniquely important.
This article discusses three grounds upon which the credibility
of asylum seekers is frequently impugned - internal inconsistencies, applicants' demeanour and presentation, and apparent
implausibilities. In determining how much weight to give to
each of these grounds, decision-makers responsible for RSD
must give due regard to cultural and linguistic barriers, the psychological consequences of trauma, and the limits of their own
experiences. This article draws upon the author's experiences as
Consultant to an Australian law firm specialising in refugee law
and practice.

Consultant; Student, BA in Communications (Social Inquiry)/LLB, University of Technology,
Sydney.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees' of 1951 , as amended by
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees3 (hereinafter, "the Refugee
Convention") defines a 'refugee' as any person who, "owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion", cannot return to their country of nationality.' In assessing whether persons claiming protection under the
Refugee Convention (for the purposes of this article, "asylum seekers") are entitled to recognition as refugees (a process known as "refugee status determination" or "RSD"), decision-makers responsible for refugee status determination
("RSD officials") must assess not only whether asylum seekers satisfy the definition of a 'refugee' under the Refugee Convention, but whether they are telling the truth about their claims - that is, whether they have provided a credible
account of what they have experienced and what they fear will happen to them
in future. Credibility assessment is a necessary part of any conceivable model
of RSD, especially where applicants for protection lack documentary proof that
their claimed experiences have in fact occurred.5 This is a particularly common
circumstance in RSD, a field in which "the range of verifiable evidence is much6
more limited than in most other types of administrativeand judicialprocedures".
Jones and Houle understate the matter in declaring that 'RSD is not easy'7;
in fact, RSD has been described as 'one of the most complex adjudicationfunctions in industrializedsocieties'. In particular, determining the credibility of asylum seekers is notoriously fraught with difficulties - given the aforementioned
frequent lack of documentary evidence, the common absence of testimonial evidence beyond what is offered by the asylum seeker themselves 9, and the fact that
even independent information such as that about the asylum seekers' countries of
origin as is available is usually insufficiently particularised to confirm whether

2

3
4
5

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 137 (adopted on 28-7-1951).
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267 (adopted on 4-10-1967).
Art. l-A(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 137 (adopted on
28-7-1951).
See UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the

Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.,

para 196 (1979), revised edition (1992) (hereinafter

"Handbook").
6

UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
SYSTEMS: FULL REPORT

7

9
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57 (2013).

Martin Jones and France Houle, Introduction: "'Buildinga Better Refugee Status Determination
System", 25(2) REFUGE 3, 6 (2008).
Cecile Rousseau et al, The Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary
Analysis of the Decision-making Process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, 15
JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES page 43 (2002).
Martin Jones and France Houle, Introduction: "'Buildinga Better Refugee Status Determination
System", 25(2) REFUGE 10 (2008).
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claimed events occurred or not. 0 (As the Hungarian Helsinki Committee's
CREDO project on refugee credibility assessment pithily observes, "country of
origin information is not a lie detector".") In this context of scarce evidence,
RSD officials have devised means to determine the credibility of asylum seekers through a scrutiny of the asylum seeker's testimony - yet these methods are
prone to error, potentially relying upon or imposing unrealistic expectations as
to memory, emotional responses and understanding of domestic immigration
systems, or failing to account for diverse human experiences. In exercising discretion as to credibility (a form of fact-finding notoriously open to 'personal
judgment that is inconsistentfrom one adjudicator to the next"12), RSD officials
must possess an acute understanding of the limits of their own perceptions and
of the available information, and exercise reasonable and culturally-appropriate
standards of assessment.
This article discusses the potential shortcomings of credibility tests commonly employed by RSD officials internationally, drawing upon comparative law,
sociological studies and psychological research. In particular, it examines three
common grounds upon which asylum seekers' claims are commonly rejected:
internal inconsistencies; asylum seekers' demeanour and presentation; and apparent implausibilities. In response to each of these grounds, this article stresses the
need for asylum seekers' claims to be judged in a range of appropriate contexts
- especially in light of cultural, psychological and linguistic divides between
RSD officials and individual asylum seekers. This article draws upon the author's
experiences as Consultant to an Australian law firm specialising in refugee law
and practice.
II. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT,
INCONSISTENCIES AND VAGUENESS
Findings that asylum seekers have exaggerated or fabricated their claims for
protection may arise for many reasons. RSD officials may, for example, find that
asylum seekers have provided inconsistent accounts (from interviewer to interviewer) of what has happened to them - whether in terms of the details of their
claim (how many times they were attacked, how many attackers there were, dates
and places) or in terms of the claim itself (with failure to raise a particular reason
to fear harm at the earliest possible stage in the process taken as proof that it has
been concocted as a show of desperation). Similarly, RSD officials may find that
asylum seekers have been impermissibly vague in recounting particular incidents
10

Jo Pettitt et al, The Use of COI in the Refugee Status Determination Process in the UK: Looking
Back, Reaching Forward, 25(2) REFUGE 182, 190 (2008). See El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F 3d
195 (2003) (US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit).
Hungarian Helsinki Committee, CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT IN ASYLUM PROCEDURES: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY TRAINING MODULE,

12

11 (2013).

Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee
Status Determination, 17 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL page 367 (2002-2003).
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of trauma - for example, providing only very general descriptions of how events
occurred and not providing further details upon prompting.
Findings of credibility on these grounds are problematic because (among
other reasons) they tend to not account for the inevitable role of memory lapses
(particularly in recounting events of trauma and torture), difficulties in translation (both linguistic and cultural) and unfamiliarity with the interview process
(and what information asylum seekers are expected to provide) in shaping how
answers are formulated. As Rosemary Byrne has noted, decision-makers have
consistently afforded probative weight to 'consistent recallfrom serial interviews'
despite scientific and medical skepticism as to the existence of any link between
'credibility and accurate recall of traumatic experiences'.3
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)'s guidelines on the
assessment of asylum seekers' claims ("the Handbook") emphasises that decision-makers should assess applicants' demeanour, the amount of detail they provide and the consistency of their claims with due regard to the circumstances
from which they have emerged. As the Handbook notes, applicants who have
emerged from fearing the authorities in their own country "may ... be afraid to
speak freely and give a full and accurate account of [their] case". 4 In Australia,
the Refugee Review Tribunal has stressed that these experiences of trauma may
influence the recall and presentation of even applicants who fear non-state actors:
"[a] person may have had traumatic experiences or be suffering from a disorder
or illness which may affect his or her ability to give evidence, his or her memory
or ability to observe and recall specific details or events", which may also contribute to "mistrust in speaking freely to persons in positions of authority".5 With
regard to the latter, in particular, Gummow and Hayne, JJ. of the High Court of
Australia have acknowledged that "the fact that [an asylum seeker] does not complain of rape to the first immigration officer who speaks to her on arrival in this
6
country... is anything but compelling evidence that no such assault occurred".
Inconsistencies are a problematic indicator of whether asylum seekers'
accounts of their experiences are truthful, simply because the nature of such
experiences (almost by definition, incidents of trauma and hardship) do not allow
for consistent and accurate recall. Survivors of torture and trauma may suffer
from loss of memory, disassociation and difficulty in concentrating, all of which
13

Rosemary Byrne, Assessing Testimonial Evidence in Asylum Proceedings: Guiding Standards

14

from the International Criminal Tribunals, 19 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 609, 623
(2007).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteriafor Determining

16

Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, para 198 (1979), revised edition (1992) (hereinafter
"Handbook").
Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia, GUIDANCE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY, para 4.3
(2012).
Abebe v. Commonwealth, 197 CLR 510, para 190 (High Court of Australia, 1999).
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compromises their ability to present a convincing narrative of their experiences
(particularly within the often-traumatic format of an interview with a refugee
status assessor).'7 As Steel, Frommer and Silove write, "[t]raumatized asylum
seekers often are unable to present a coherent trauma narrative to the deci8
sion-maker"'1
simply by virtue of the long-term consequences of their experiences; for example, torture survivors' elevated rates of "depression, anxiety, sleep
disturbance, nightmares, impaired concentration and memory [and] PTSD"'19
present significant barriers to the consistent and coherent recounting of experiences of hardship. Significantly, traumatic experiences impact both upon applicants' willingness to provide detailed accounts of their experiences (with varying
openness to interviewers from instance to instance inevitably influencing the
degree of detail provided) and their ability to do so. As Steel, Frommer and
Silove note:
"Because traumatic memories are encoded while an individual is experiencing extreme anxiety, the normal processing and
integration of these experiences is disrupted... Instead of being
encoded into memory in an organized, coherent and integrated
manner, traumatic experiences are often encoded in a disorganized and fragmented manner...20
Beyond issues encountered in the encoding of memories, the nature of asylum
seekers' recall is similarly context-specific. Herlily, Scragg and Turner note that
"depressed patients are biased towards recalling negative personal memories in
favour of positive ones', and may suffer from 'difficulties in retrieving specific
autobiographicalmemories".2' As an example, they note that an asylum seeker's description of his treatment varied from "we were slapped around" to (when
recounting the incident in question on another occasion) "we were badly beaten". 22 While a discrepancy of this kind may be mistaken by a decision-maker for
an asylum seeker exaggerating their experiences (or even recounting a concocted
Cecile Rousseau et al, The Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary

18

19

20

21

Analysis of the Decision-making Process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, 15
JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES 43, 49 (2002).
Zachary Steel, Naomi Frommer and Derrick Silove, PartI The mental health impacts of migration: the law and its effects: Failing to understand: refugee determination and the traumatised
applicant, 27 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 511, 517 (2004).
Zachary Steel, Naomi Frommer and Derrick Silove, PartI The mental health impacts of migration: the law and its effects: Failing to understand: refugee determination and the traumatised
applicant, 27 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 511, 515 (2004).
Zachary Steel, Naomi Frommer and Derrick Silove, PartI The mental health impacts of migration: the law and its effects: Failing to understand: refugee determination and the traumatised
applicant, 27 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 511, 517 (2004).
Jane Herlily, Peter Scragg and Stuart Turner, Discrepancies in autobiographical memories
implications for the assessment of asylum seekers: repeated interviews study, 324 BRITISH
MEDICAL JOURNAL 324, 325 (2002).

2 Jane Herlily, Peter Scragg and Stuart Turner, Discrepancies in autobiographical memories
implications for the assessment of asylum seekers: repeated interviews study, 324 BRITISH
MEDICAL JOURNAL 324, 327 (2002).
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experience, and failing to remain consistent about imaginary details), Herlily,
Scragg and Turner suggest that instead the asylum seeker "may simply have been
in a different mood state in each interview, thus giving different evaluations of
23
his experience.
The UNHCR have emphasised the need for decision-makers "to have realistic expectations of what an applicant should know and remember" in light of
the natural limitations of human memory. 24 The degree of detail provided by
asylum seekers - both in totality and between varying occasions - will depend
upon a wide array of factors, and cannot be attributed to a desire to mislead or
fabricate claims without further evidence to this effect. For example, memories
which have been repeatedly recalled may be presented in more detail than those
which have not, whereas separate incidents may become fused as "[b]lended or
generic memories".25 (Juliet Cohen has similarly testified that "[p]articularlywith
repeated experiences, information specific to one episode tends to drop out while
information common to other similar episodes isincorporated into the general
schema and retained", forming "a kind of blended memory". 26) The UNHCR further cautions that "[a] person's recall of dates, frequency and duration isnearly
always reconstructedfrom inference, estimation and guesswork".27 These problems of recall are, of course, not restricted to the particular circumstances of
asylum seekers; as noted by Lee, Carr and Finkelstein, JJ. in W3751O1A, "[a]s anyone with even a passing familiarity with litigation will know, to have to give a
decision-maker three or more separate versions of the basis for a claim is an
invidious position to find oneself in, even in the case of an honest witness... Itis
inevitable that each version will be slightly different, and may even be very different once the impact of [an] interpreter istaken into account".28
In light of the above, it must be consistently borne in mind in assessing asylum seekers that inconsistent, late or vague claims are not necessarily untrue,
and should not be judged to be false simply because they are inconsistent, late
or vague. Given the extremely serious consequences that may transpire from a
negative finding (including the potential exposure of an unsuccessful applicant
to detention, torture or death), a finding that any asylum seeker is lying about
an aspect of their claims must never be made lightly: it should only be reached
3 Jane Herlily, Peter Scragg and Stuart Turner, Discrepancies in autobiographical memories
implications for the assessment of asylum seekers: repeated interviews study, 324 BRITISH
MEDICAL JOURNAL 324, 327 (2002).
24
25
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where a far broader range of indicia point to this conclusion, and where other
explanations for discrepancies are not satisfactory.
Even where an asylum seeker is found to have exaggerated an aspect of their
claims (or to have provided accounts of mounting severity as they progress
through the RSD process), this should not be regarded as fatal to the entirety of
their claims. Gummow and Hayne, JJ. of the High Court of Australia concede (in
obiter) that "the fact that an applicantfor refugee status may yield to temptation
to embroider an account of his or her history ishardly surprising", given that
"an applicantfor refugee status is,on one view of events, engaged in an often
desperate battle for freedom, ifnot life itself'. 29 Foster, J. of the Federal Court of
Australia similarly observed that "[e]xaggeration or even fabrication of parts of
a witness's testimony does not exclude the possibility that there is a hard core of
acceptable evidence within the body of the testimony".30 These Australian judicial
observations have been independently confirmed by the International Association
of Refugee Law Judges, which cautions that "[riejection of some evidence, material or peripheral,relating to past or present facts will not necessarily lead to a
rejection of all of the claimant's evidence" - with the difficulty of justifying such
rejection increasingly depending upon the extent to which the claims found to be
fabricated are 'peripheral' to the core of the applicant's claims.3' Even where none
of an asylum seeker's claimed experiences - beyond their identity as a member
of a particular racial, religious, political, national or particular social group - are
credible, they may nonetheless be eligible for protection on the basis of harm
feared within the reasonably foreseeable future by reason of their protected traits
under the Refugee Convention. As Michael Kagan puts it, "[a] person does not
need to be credible to be a refugee".3 2 An undue emphasis upon whether asylum
seekers are credible, truthful witnesses in their own cause may hence, in some
cases, obscure the true nature of the RSD official's adjudicative task: to determine whether an individual applicant is entitled to protection under the Refugee
Convention.
III. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT,
DEMEANOUR AND INTERPRETATION
The 'demeanour' of an asylum seeker (including how they present themselves,
relate their experiences, and respond to questioning) may be found by RSD officials to be inconsistent with their claimed identity or experiences. An asylum
'9 Abebe v. Commonwealth, 197 CLR 510, 577, 578 (High Court of Australia, 1999).
30 Guo v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, FCA 1263, para 26 (Federal Court of
31

Australia, 1996).
International Association of Refugee Law Judges,
SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION CLAIMS UNDER

ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY IN REFUGEE AND

THE EU QUALIFICATION

DIRECTIVE:

JUDICIAL CRITERIA

AND

(2013).
3 Michael Kagan, IsTruth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee
Status Determination, 17 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL page 367 (2002-2003).
STANDARDS, 40
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seeker's self-presentation and ability to answer questions may invite comment and
criticism on multiple fronts; an asylum seeker who appears to 'avoid the question' or to provide rambling, irrelevant answers may be as easily suspected as
an asylum seeker whose answers appear rehearsed and lacking in spontaneity,
or who shows little emotion in recounting traumatic events. However, an applicant's demeanour is similarly an inexact guide to the truth of their claims to fear
persecution. The International Association of Refugee Law Judges have bluntly
asserted that "using demeanour as a basis for credibility assessment should be
avoided in virtually all situations", to be used only "in a context of evidenced
understanding of the relevant culture, and in acknowledgment of culture as a
33
repertoire of possible behaviours which are not binding on any individual".
It is in this respect, in particular, that "[d]iffering social and cultural mores
between a refugee claimant, his or her country of origin and his or her country
34
of asylum can produce obstacles to inquiry and misunderstanding".
The failure by asylum seekers to exhibit particular emotional responses when recounting
their experiences (such as overt grief or hesitation) cannot necessarily be regarded
as evidence that these experiences are fabricated. As Joanna Ruppel writes, "[t]
he manner in which individuals respond to questions may... be influenced by culture".35 What would be perceived in a Western context as an evasive or unduly
taciturn response may be eminently justified by the cultural norms of the asylum seeker, particularly one who has learned in their country of origin to "volunteer nothing to people in uniforms" (or to otherwise distrust figures of authority,
choosing not to show weakness or to "give too much away").3 6 As Walter Kalin
writes, individuals who have been forced to hide certain traits in their countries
of origin "have deeply internalised the values of secrecy and suspicion towards
outsiders"; such people "have difficulty communicating openly and revealing
themselves, their feelings, beliefs and experiences to everyone not belonging to
3' 7
their group because by doing so they violate basic norms of their subculture
(creating apparently evasive answers, presented in a manner which may signal
untruthfulness in the cultural context of the RSD official).
Demeanour may furthermore prove deceptive where asylum seekers have
suffered torture or trauma. A flat effect or seeming detachment from the events
related may owe as much to conscious or unconscious disassociation, or even
3

International Association of Refugee Law Judges,
SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION CLAIMS UNDER

ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY IN REFUGEE AND

THE EU QUALIFICATION

DIRECTIVE:

JUDICIAL CRITERIA

AND

STANDARDS, 41-42

14

15

(2013).
Martin Jones and France Houle, Introduction: Building a Better Refugee Status Determination
System, 25(2) REFUGE 3, 7 (2008).
Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a Benefit of the Doubt Standard in Credibility Evaluation of
Applications, 23(1) COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, 13-14 (1991-1992).
Ruppel, The Need for a Benefit of the Doubt Standard in Credibility Evaluation of
Applications, 23(1) COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, 13-14 (1991-1992).
Kalin, Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum
Hearing,20 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW, 230, 232 (1986).
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excessive rehearsal prior to presenting one's account of his or her experiences (in
light of the dire consequences of failure), as to any attempt to mislead RSD officials. In interviewing applicants for asylum (especially those who have endured
uniquely atrocious acts in their country of origin), RSD officials must be conscious of the role that their own actions, and their own demeanour, may play in
shaping that of the asylum seeker, who may detect the scepticism (or even cynicism) of an RSD official (or otherwise deem the RSD official unwilling to share
their experiences or to empathise with their plight) and hence prove "reserved
and hesitant in the manner in which they express themselves and thus... present a
38
fragmented and confusing story".
RSD officials' inability to determine meaning through demeanour across cultural barriers is compounded by asylum seekers' reliance upon interpreters (in
addition to the problems created by interpretation in assessing inconsistencies,
as noted above). As Michael Barnett observes, "[w]hen evidence ischannelled
through an interpreter it is transformed by the interpreter's voice, dress, mannerisms, linguistic competence, age, race and gender ' 39 - rendering assessments
of 'demeanour' ultimately subject not only to the actions and self-presentation of
the asylum seeker but to the characteristics of a third party. When communicating across cultural lines, asylum seekers may have difficulty clearly articulating
concepts (creating artificially, or inadvertently, evasive answers); as Barnett notes,
"[l]iteral wordfor word translations"may, where there is no precise or even similar equivalent to a given word in the RSD official's language, produce "nonsensi4
cal utterances".0
IV. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT AND PLAUSIBILITY
Asylum seekers' claims may be rejected because the accounts of their experiences fail to satisfy decision-makers' expectations as to how persecuted people
'ought' to behave or react. As Walter Kalin puts it, "[too often officials assume
that the way they think isalso the way the asylum-seeker thinks".4' RSD officials
may challenge asylum seekers' claims to have performed particular actions or
taken part in particular activities in their countries of origin (because of, amongst
other reasons, the dangers involved in doing so), or critique apparently implausible escapes from custody or claimed courses of conduct on the part of agents of
persecution. RSD officials may, for example, claim that it would not be plausible
for insurgent or terrorist groups to allow individuals to live or to escape despite
31 Walter

Kalin, Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum
Hearing,20 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW, 230, 232 (1986).
39 Michael Barnett, Mind Your Language Interpreters in Australian Immigration Proceedings, 10
UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY LAW REVIEW 109, 111-112 (2006).
40 Michael Barnett, Mind Your Language Interpreters in Australian Immigration Proceedings, 10
UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY LAW REVIEW 109, 112 (2006).
41 Walter Kalin, Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum
Hearing,20 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW, 230, 234 (1986).
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repeated acts of opposition - despite the fact that, as noted by the US Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Lopez-Reyes, 'conjecture' as to what guerrillas
would and would not do "is not a substitute for substantialevidence".42 As Mark
Henderson has sardonically noted, where mere allegations of implausibility are
levelled without evidence to support them, "it can only be assumed that they are
based either on what the [RSD official] would do if he were a prison guard, a
guerrilla or a drugs baron, or on how he believes a reasonable prison guard,
guerrilla or drugs baron would behave. How the [RSD official] works this out
isnever revealed. '43 In such cases, plausibility findings run the risk of merely
amounting to "the subjective view of the judge", reflecting "the judge's own personal theories of 'truth' and 'risk."' but little else. 44 Decision-makers' instincts
45
and 'gut feelings' are not an appropriate guide in refugee status determination.
Given the general rule within administrative law that decision-makers should
not make findings on the basis of no evidence - or based upon irrelevant considerations - findings of implausibility should only be made upon the satisfaction of a relatively high evidentiary threshold. In W148/OQA (2001), Justice Lee
of the Federal Court of Australia observed that a circumstance will be 'implausible' where it is "beyond human experience ofpossible occurrences, that isto say,
inherently unlikely".46 The emphasis in this sentence must be upon human experience - not the experiences of a particular culture, nor the anticipated reactions
of a particular decision-maker (who must, in conducting RSD, take into account
the extent to which their background and outlook may differ quite dramatically
from the asylum seeker being assessed). As noted by Neuberger, LJ. (with regard
to the United Kingdom) in HK (2006), "it islikely that the country which an asylum-seeker has left will be suffering from the sort of problems and dislocations
with which the overwhelming majority of residents of this country will be wholly
47
unfamiliar".
In practice, plausibility can only be assessed through close attention to the
asylum seeker's context - both the national and cultural context from which they
have fled and their personal and psychological traits. 48 In Valtchev, Muldoon, J.
4' Lopez-Reyes v. Immigration and Naturalisation Service, 79 F 3d 908, para 5 (US Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1996).
41 Mark Henderson, BEST PRACTICE GUIDE To ASYLUM AND HUMAN RIGHTS APPEALS 9 (2003).
44 International Association of Refugee Law Judges, ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY IN REFUGEE AND
SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION CLAIMS UNDER

THE EU QUALIFICATION

DIRECTIVE:

JUDICIAL CRITERIA

AND

34 (2013).
45 RKS v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal, IEHC 436 (High Court of Ireland, 2004).
46 W148/OQA v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, FCA 679, para 21 (Federal
STANDARDS,

Court of Australia, 2001).
HK v. Secy. of State for the Home Department, EWCA Civ 1037, para 29 (Court of Appeal of

England and Wales, 2006).
41 International Association of Refugee Law Judges, ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY IN REFUGEE AND
SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION CLAIMS UNDER
STANDARDS,

THE EU QUALIFICATION

DIRECTIVE:

JUDICIAL CRITERIA

AND

35 (2013); HK v. Secy. of State for the Home Department, EWCA Civ 1037, paras

27-28 (2006) (Court of Appeal of England and Wales).
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of the Federal Court of Canada asserted that "actions which appear implausible when judged from Canadian standards might be plausible when considered
from within the claimant's milieu. '49 A similar theme was struck by Sir Thomas
Bingham in 1985:
"[N]o judge worth his salt could possibly assume that men of
different nationalities, educations, trades, experience, creeds and
temperaments would act as he might think he would have done
or even - which might be quite different - in accordance with
5
his concept of what a reasonable man would have done.
These observations were approvingly cited by Keene, LJ. in the context of
refugee status determination in Y v. Secy. of State for the Home Department
(2006).

5

.

In practice, however, this is what many decision-makers attempt; they decide
that certain claimed events or actions are implausible without due regard to the
role played by culture in shaping individuals' actions, including the role of the
decision-maker's own culture in determining their construction of what is 'plausible'. In the United Kingdom, the UNHCR has criticised decision makers for
"attempting to guess the thought process of a third party" and applying a "narrow UK-perspective when assessing events alleged to have taken place in significantly different cultural,political and social contexts".5 2 Similar approaches have
been condemned by the Federal Court in Australia, with Merkel, J. condemning
the confidence with which some RSD officials "find themselves able to make
adverse findings on credibility on the basis that the evidence given by claimants is 'implausible', 'incredible' or 'concocted"' - in the absence of "clear and
5 3
cogent evidence" to justify such findings.
In place of these flawed approaches, decision-makers must ensure that asylum seekers' claims are assessed (to determine whether they could plausibly
have occurred) through a close examination of circumstances in the countries
of origin in question, with due regard paid to the uncertainty, unpredictability
and impunity which prevail in many source countries for refugees (particularly
where the agents of persecution feared are non-state actors, who may act with a
greater degree of arbitrariness and capriciousness than state officials). Even where
accounts are so implausible that no conclusion can be drawn other than that
'9 Valtchev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), FCT 776, para 7 (Federal Court of
Canada, 2001).
51 Sir Thomas Bingham, The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues, 38(1)
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1, 14 (1985).
51 EWCA Civ 1223, para 25 (Court of Appeal of England and Wales, 2006).
52 Jo Pettitt et al, The Use of COI in the Refugee Status Determination Process in the UK: Looking

5'

Back, Reaching Forward,25(2) REFUGE 182, 184 (2008).
Thevendram v. Ministerfor Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs, FCA 1910, para 59 (Federal
Court of Australia, 2000).
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they are false, the International Association of Refugee Law Judges caution that
are likely to be less persuasive than
"[d]ecisions based solely on implausibility
54
those based on a wider range of criteria".

V. CONCLUSION
It is essential to conduct some form of credibility assessment in determining
the outcome of asylum seekers' claims. The alternative - of acceptance of any
claim for protection under the Refugee Convention without any scrutiny as to
whether such claims are based in real occurrences - is by any measure politically
unsustainable, jeopardising the entire international regime for the protection of
refugees. Furthermore, the degree of weight to be afforded to matters that go to
applicants' credibility in individual circumstances is difficult to mandate through
statutes, precedents or policies; it will depend to a great extent upon the circumstances of individual cases.
Despite this, the need for sensitivity and understanding in determining asylum
seekers' claims under the Refugee Convention must always be paramount. Every
claim for protection under the Refugee Convention must be assessed in light of its
own circumstances (both those of the asylum seeker in question and those prevailing in the country from which they have fled), rather than by reference to the
instincts and expectations of an RSD official whose everyday circumstances are
potentially far removed from the lived experiences of a refugee.
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